Taking Justice Kennedy Seriously: Why Windsor Was Decided  quite apart from principles of federalism by Knowles, Helen J.
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 3
Winter 2015
Taking Justice Kennedy Seriously: Why Windsor
Was Decided "quite apart from principles of
federalism"
Helen J. Knowles
Skidmore College
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Knowles, Helen J. (2015) "Taking Justice Kennedy Seriously: Why Windsor Was Decided "quite apart from principles of federalism","
Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 20: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol20/iss1/3
KNOWLESFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015 3:24 PM 
 
 
24 
 
Taking Justice Kennedy Seriously:  
Why Windsor Was Decided “quite 
apart from principles of federalism” 
Helen J. Knowles* 
On June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court 
announced its decision in United States v. Windsor,1 striking down 
section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).2   In this 
Article, I refute the argument that Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court in that case is primarily animated by principles of 
federalism.  Drawing on the arguments that I made in The Tie 
Goes to Freedom: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy on Liberty,3 I argue 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Government, Skidmore College; B.A., 
Liverpool Hope University College; Ph.D., Boston University.  Email: 
hknowles@skidmore.edu.  This Article is a revised version of a paper 
presented at the Annual Conference of the American Politics Group of the 
Political Studies Association (UK), St. Anne’s College and the Rothermere 
American Institute, University of Oxford, January 5-7, 2014.  I would like to 
thank the conference panel chair, Alex Waddan, and the members of the 
panel audience – especially Ursula Hackett – for their feedback and 
comments.  I am exceptionally grateful to Lauren Maher (Whitman College 
‘13; Gonzaga University School of Law, Class of 2016) for her outstanding 
research assistance, without which this Article could not have been 
completed. I am also very grateful to her and three more of my former 
students, Christian Castaing (Grinnell College, Class of 2014), Andrew Soler 
(Cornell Law School, Class of 2014), and Julianne Toia (Grinnell College, 
Class of 2015), for their feedback on an earlier draft of this Article.  Last but 
not least, I would like to thank my colleague Ron Seyb at Skidmore College 
for his helpful reading suggestions, and the following students for their 
detailed feedback on an earlier draft: Addison W. Bennett (‘16), Cara M. 
Cancelmo (‘16), Richard Landry (‘16), Thomas R. Patino (‘16), Alicia C. Pierce 
(‘15), Kelly Polhemus (‘15), Elena L. Veatch (‘16), and Roger G. Wieand (‘14). 
 1.  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). 
 2.  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
 3.  See generally HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE 
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that in Windsor, Justice Kennedy made a commitment to equal 
liberty, just as he did in the landmark cases Romer v. Evans4 and 
Lawrence v. Texas.5  That commitment wholeheartedly embraces 
the spirit of egalitarianism and social justice underlying President 
Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 “Great Society Address.” 6   Although 
President Johnson’s “abundance and liberty for all” imperative 
was meant to address the racial and wealth inequities of his time, 
the speech’s progressive themes were grounded in broad moral 
principles that apply with just as much force to the inequities 
facing the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) 
community today.7  Justice Kennedy’s articulation of those themes 
in Windsor gets lost, however, if scholarly analysis of his majority 
opinion focuses not on equal liberty, but on federalism. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago, on Friday, May 22, 1964, President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson delivered a commencement address to the 
graduating class of the University of Michigan.8  Looking out at 
the sea of people crowded into Michigan Stadium on that hot and 
humid early-summer morning, 9  the President spoke for 
approximately twenty minutes10 about “[t]he challenge of the next 
half century”—namely, “to advance the quality of our American 
civilization.”11  Reflecting upon this speech, which became known 
 
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (2009). 
 4.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 5.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 6.   See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692; see also generally Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 36th President, U.S., Remarks at the University of Michigan (May 
22, 1964) [hereinafter President Johnson’s Remarks at the University of 
Michigan], available at AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26262 (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 7.   See President Johnson’s Remarks at the University of Michigan, 
supra note 6. 
 8.  Id.  Originally scheduled for Saturday, May 23, the University of 
Michigan’s commencement was moved to Friday, May 22 because of the 
President’s schedule.  See ROBERT M. WARNER, THE ANATOMY OF A SPEECH: 
LYNDON JOHNSON’S GREAT SOCIETY ADDRESS 4 (1978), available at http:// 
bentley.umich.edu/exhibits/lbj1964/lbjspeech.pdf.  
 9.  WARNER, supra note 8, at 1.  Estimates of the audience’s size range 
from 70,000–85,000.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  If one includes the frequent applause that punctuated his words.  
See id at 4. 
 11.  President Johnson’s Remarks at the University of Michigan, supra 
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as the “Great Society Address,” Robert M. Warner, the Director of 
the Michigan Historical Collections at the University’s Bentley 
Historical Library, wrote in 1978 that “[m]uch of what [the 
speech] contained has meaning for today.”12  What did he mean by 
that?  Was it true then?  And, does it still have “meaning for 
today” in 2014 as we recognize the fiftieth anniversary of the 
speech? 
In this Article, I offer some answers to these questions.  It is 
not my intention to engage in an extended exposition on the 
speech itself, or indeed on the legacy of the Great Society.  Rather, 
my suggested brief answers engage this Article in a discussion of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in United States v. 
Windsor.13   In that case, the Court struck down section 3 of 
DOMA, holding that it violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.14  Section 3 of DOMA 
stated that, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, 
or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and 
one woman.”15  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy argued 
that section 3 was inconsistent with the Constitution’s 
commitment to guaranteeing equal liberty.16  This is very similar 
to the reasoning that Kennedy employed in the majority opinions 
in Romer v. Evans17 and Lawrence v. Texas,18 two other landmark 
gay rights rulings.  I argue that this commitment in Windsor 
wholeheartedly embraces the spirit of egalitarianism and social 
justice at the heart of the legacy of the 1964 Great Society speech. 
In making this argument, I offer a very different picture of 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Windsor than that which has 
been painted by many scholars who contend it was “based on 
federalism.”19 
 
note 6. 
 12.  WARNER, supra note 8, at 4; see also Richard M. Doolen, 
Introduction, in WARNER, supra note 8. 
 13.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 14.  Id. at 2696; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V; 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
 15.  1 U.S.C. § 7. 
 16.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682-96. 
 17.  517 U.S. 620, 623–36 (1996). 
 18.  539 U.S. 558, 562–79 (2003). 
 19.  See, e.g., Rachel Weiner, Will the DOMA decision kill gay marriage 
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The argument that Kennedy’s Windsor opinion is “deeply 
rooted in federalism” 20  and contains considerable “federalism-
laden analysis”21  is consistent with the dissenting observation 
made by Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote that the Court’s 
“judgment is based on federalism.” 22   It is, however, Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting assessment of the federalism references with 
which this Article agrees.23  Scalia is right that federalism is not 
the dominant theme of the opinion.  It is “sprinkled with elements 
of federalism” (amongst other things), 24  but the opinion’s 
“treatment” of the vertical separation of powers is “ultimately 
inconclusive and nondispositive”;25 it is “relevant, but only by the 
 
bans?, WASH. POST (June 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
the-fix/wp/2013/06/26/will-the-doma-decision-kill-gay-marriage-bans/.  One 
commentator went so far as to describe the opinion as “a liberal result 
wrapped in conservative values,” an opinion that “reads like a paean to 
conservative values, invoking totems such as states’ rights, federalism, and 
freedom from the yoke of federal oversight, couched in language a tea partier 
would cherish.”  James Oliphant, Supreme Court Rulings on Gay Marriage: A 
Liberal Result Wrapped in Conservative Values, NAT’L J. (June 26, 2013), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/supreme-court-rulings-on-
gay-marriage-a-liberal-result-wrapped-in-conservative-values-20130626.  
Many of the commentaries that I critique in this Article were written quickly, 
in the heat of the moments following the announcement of the decision in 
Windsor.  This serves, in part, to absolve some authors of their misleading 
interpretations of the opinions in that case.  After all, closer inspection 
inevitably brings to light aspects that were missed and/or overlooked in the 
rush to meet deadlines (institutionally-imposed or self-imposed).  However, 
the fact remains that much of what was written was constructed upon 
interpretive foundations laid much earlier, either in academic literature, 
amicus briefs, or commentaries that followed the granting of certiorari and/or 
the oral arguments in this case.  Consequently, it would be wrong to avoid 
engaging in critical analysis of them because of their rapid response nature. 
 20.  Trevor Burrus, Next Steps for Marriage Equality, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 28, 2013, 11:47 AM),  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trevor-burrus/ 
next-steps-for-marriage-equality_b_3516545.html. 
 21.  Randy Barnett, Federalism marries liberty in the DOMA decision, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/ 
federalism-marries-liberty-in-the-doma-decision/. 
 22.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 23.  See id. at 2697–2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 24.  Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
219, 219 (2013). 
 25.  Helen Alvare, Taking sides on the meaning of marriage, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/ 
taking-sides-on-the-meaning-of-marriage/.  
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back door.”26  To be sure, Justice Kennedy does discuss the fact 
that federal intrusions into definitions of marriage are unusual.27  
However, as Deborah Hellman observes, “discussion [is] not made 
in support of a federalism rationale.”28  Instead, at the heart of the 
opinion is a guarantee of equal liberty that is very similar to the 
guarantee that was made to gay and lesbian Americans in Romer 
and Lawrence.29 
In this Article, the focus of my critique is a pair of 
commentaries that offer particularly interesting, substantive 
arguments in support of the “based on federalism”30 theory.  First, 
I examine Professor Randy Barnett’s contention that Justice 
Kennedy “used the interference with the traditional province of 
states to regulate marriage to justify heightened scrutiny under 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”31  Second, I analyze 
Professor Rick Hills’s claim that Windsor “recogni[zes] that state 
law can define, at least in part, the scope of federal constitutional 
rights by (for instance) defining what constitutes an arbitrary 
classification under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause.”32  
This, Hill contends, makes “the feds . . . more constrained by 
national constitutional rights than are the states.”33 
Some say that Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor is grounded in 
preserving principles of federalism—a subject about which he 
frequently waxes lyrical, labeling it the “unique contribution of the 
 
 26.  Ilya Somin, The DOMA Decision and Federalism, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2013, 11:29 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/26/ 
the-doma-decision-and-federalism/. 
 27.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681. 
 28.  Deborah Hellman, Scalia is right: Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Windsor doesn’t rest on federalism, BALKINIZATION (June 27, 2013, 5:29 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/normal-0-false-false-false-en-us-x-
none.html.  
 29.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996).  It should be noted that I focus upon the merits of Windsor in 
this Article, and I do not discuss the jurisdictional component of the decision. 
 30.  Weiner, supra note 19. 
 31.  Barnett, supra note 21 (emphasis added). 
 32.  Rick Hills, Windsor and the states’ power to define federal 
constitutional rights: Does Kennedy revive Justice Harlan’s Theory of Rights?, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (June 26, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2013/06/windsor-and-the-states-power-to-define-federal-
constitutional-rights.html.  A similar argument is made in the following 
article, Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality 
in United States v. Windsor, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2012–2013, at 117, 117–18. 
 33.  Hills, supra note 32. 
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Framers to political science and political theory.”34  Indeed, as we 
will see, much of the “dignity” rhetoric in the opinion is suggestive 
of federalism because it is state oriented—rather than individual 
oriented (interestingly, this is a point lost on most of the 
commentators who argued that the opinion emphasizes 
federalism). 35   Ultimately, however, I demonstrate that the 
Windsor majority’s primary commitment is to the constitutional 
guarantee of equal liberty.  This guarantee is neither as obviously 
stated nor as passionately expressed as it was in Romer and 
Lawrence; the opinion is devoid of the “gauzy platitudes” with 
which Kennedy’s opinions are so often “studded.”36  Nevertheless, 
that guarantee of equal liberty is at the heart of the opinion and 
portends, in the not-too-distant future, an America in which state 
bans on gay marriage cannot coexist with the U.S. Constitution. 
Does Windsor open the next chapter in the liberal legacy of 
the Great Society?  This Article provides an affirmative answer to 
that question.  However, it does so by first considering some of the 
complexities of the Great Society legacy—including the difference 
between policies and principles.  Additionally, the Article 
recognizes that while “[t]he central principles of Lyndon Johnson’s 
program . . . were those of amelioration and opportunity,”37 those 
principles were not, in 1964, expected to extend to the country’s 
LGBT community. 
II. THE “GREAT SOCIETY” AND THE LGBT COMMUNITY:  FROM POLICY 
EXCLUSION TO PRINCIPLED INCLUSION? 
In 2014, as the nation recognized the fiftieth anniversary of 
President Johnson’s speech, the legacy of the Great Society 
 
 34.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 35.  The exception is Neomi Rao, The Trouble With Dignity And Rights 
Of Recognition, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2013). 
 36.  ADAM LIPTAK, TO HAVE AND UPHOLD 54 (Kindle ed. 2013).  See also 
Jeffrey Toobin, Adieu, DOMA!, NEW YORKER (July 8, 2013), http:// 
www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2013/07/08/130708taco_talk_toobin. 
Jeffrey Toobin is no fan of Justice Kennedy’s judicial writing style, which he 
describes as “windy and verbose at times.”  Id.  Nonetheless, Toobin was 
positively ebullient in his praise for the Justice’s Windsor opinion, describing 
it as being “bracingly plainspoken” and “[t]o a degree rare in the dusty 
archives of the Supreme Court . . . a pleasure, even a thrill, to read.”  Id.   
 37.  JOHN A. ANDREW III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY 95 
(1998). 
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remains unclear.  Indeed, as Ursula Hackett masterfully 
demonstrates, the very term “Great Society” is susceptible to 
multitudinous understandings and definitions – hence her 
argument that we should really be talking about “Great 
Societies.”38  To be sure, major civil rights advancements were 
made as a result of the Great Society agenda, but many of the 
President’s ambitious goals remain elusive, having encountered 
massive resistance almost as soon as they were announced.  
Within fifteen months of addressing the Michigan graduates 
Johnson signed landmark legislation into law, including the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.39   However, 
many of the challenges which the President asked the country to 
confront went unmet.  In part this was inevitable.  They fell victim 
to the President’s personal, grandiose expectations.  Johnson 
defended the Great Society using “analysis presented in a manner 
that often failed to distinguish between expectations and 
established realities.” 40   The President’s “gigantic aspirations” 
were too big not to fail, because they were “clearly unattainable 
within one Presidency, or one generation.”41  They were, therefore, 
destined to rise or fall on the (mis)fortune and (dis)favor of 
subsequent executive administrations and congressional 
majorities.  And then there was, as Doris Kearns Goodwin points 
out, the mire and malaise of the “[i]f it hadn’t been for Vietnam” 
 
 38.  Ursula Hackett, The Six Great Societies 11–13 (January 5–7, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (presented at the 40th Anniversary Conference of 
the American Politics Group of the Political Studies Association (UK), St. 
Anne’s College and the Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford) 
(on file with author).  What follows in this Article is merely a very brief 
overview of the “Great Society.”  It is not my intention, in this Article, to 
revisit in detail the legacy of the Great Society.  For excellent scholarly 
treatments of different aspects of the Great Society agenda—both during and 
after the Johnson presidency, see generally, for example: JOSEPH A. 
CALIFANO, JR., THE TRIUMPH & TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON (Texas A &M 
Univ. Press 2000) (1991); ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON 
AND HIS TIMES: 1961-1973 (1998); DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, LYNDON JOHNSON 
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1991). 
 39.  For a good overview of the Great Society’s policy accomplishments, 
see Joseph A. Califano, Jr., What Was Really Great About The Great Society, 
WASH. MONTHLY ONLINE, Oct. 1999, at 13, available at http:// 
www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/1999/9910.califano.html.  
 40.  GOODWIN, supra note 38, at 219. 
 41.  Id. at 211. 
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One way to evaluate the legacy of the Great Society speech is 
to draw a distinction between policy and principle.  For, while 
objectives such as confronting poverty “were widely accepted,” it 
was often the case (as is so true of many facets of American 
governance) that “specific proposals to reach them sparked 
debate,” thereby generating delay and, ultimately, defeat.43  In 
closing the second of his two-volume biographical treatment of 
Lyndon Johnson, Robert Dallek reminds us of the 
historiographical value inherent in drawing this policy-principle 
distinction: 
Debates about the sort of social engineering Johnson 
sponsored will not disappear.  Nevertheless, there is at 
least one side of Johnson’s reformism that the great 
majority of Americans have embraced and seem unlikely 
to abandon for the foreseeable future.  There is a striking 
analogy here between Johnson and FDR. Roosevelt’s New 
Deal never brought full recovery from the Depression.  
But it put in place a series of measures that humanized 
the American industrial system . . . . 
Similarly, many of the laws spawned by Lyndon 
Johnson’s war on poverty and Great Society have either 
fallen into disrepute or command little support from most 
Americans.  But the spirit and some of the substance 
behind Johnson’s reform programs maintain a hold on the 
public imagination that endures. . . .  Johnson’s poverty 
war and reach for a Great Society may seem somewhat 
outdated or inadequate to current challenges, but the 
humanizing force behind them abides and gives both men 
historical standing as visionaries who helped advance the 
national well-being and fulfill the promise of American 
life.44 
 
 42.  Id. at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. ch. 9. 
 43.  ANDREW, supra note 37, at 197.  I fondly recall that Norman Zucker, 
my Congress course professor during my junior exchange year at the 
University of Rhode Island, began the semester by emphasizing that “delay 
and defeat” should be at the intellectual center of our learning about the 
legislative process in the United States. 
 44.  DALLEK, supra note 38, at 624–25. 
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Admittedly, in the intervening years, both the underlying 
principles of the Great Society speech and the policies it spawned 
came under attack from Republicans and often went undefended 
by Democrats.  For example, Newt Gingrich rode his 1990s 
Republican Congressional revolution into town on the back of a 
horse emblazoned with the message that the blame for the 
nation’s woes could be placed squarely upon the shoulders of 
Democrats who refused “to recognize that Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society has failed.” 45   This strategy was, in part, possible 
(although ultimately unsuccessful) because for several decades 
‘liberal’ Democrats enjoyed a decidedly uneasy relationship with 
the legislative policy accomplishments and the broader principles 
of the Great Society.  They frequently “[ran] from the legacy of the 
Great Society and the 1960s, seeking to rebut charges that [they 
were] too effete, too closely tied to racial and ethnic minorities and 
too out of touch with the mainstream of American life.”46 
As Philip A. Klinkner and Thomas Schaller persuasively 
argue, however, those very same legislative accomplishments and 
underlying Great Society principles helped facilitate the creation 
of a voting base which helped elect Barack Obama in 2008.47  
“Somewhere,” they write, “Lyndon Johnson is smiling,” for it was 
the outcome of that presidential election that suggested the 
“Democrats have erected a majority coalition based on the votes of 
non-whites and the college-educated”—what Klinkner and 
Schaller term “the Latent Great Society Majority.”48 
On January 21, 2013, President Obama gave the second 
Inaugural Address of his presidency.49  He invoked the words and 
spirit of the Declaration of Independence, just as President 
Johnson had done nearly a half century earlier in Ann Arbor.50  
 
 45.  LINDA KILLIAN, THE FRESHMEN: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE REPUBLICAN 
REVOLUTION? 239 (1999) (quoting Newt Gingrich, 58th Speaker of the U.S. 
House of Representatives). 
 46.  Philip A. Klinkner & Thomas Schaller, LBJ’s Revenge: The 2008 
Election and the Rise of the Great Society Coalition, FORUM, Oct. 2008, at 1, 
15. 
 47.  See generally id. 
 48.  Id. at 5, 15. 
 49.  Barack H. Obama, 44th President, U.S., Inaugural Address (January 
21, 2013) [hereinafter President Obama’s Second Inaugural Address], 
available at WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/ 
01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 50.  See id.; President Johnson’s Remarks at the University of Michigan, 
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This time, however, the tone struck by the President was far more 
inclusive and less utopian.  The country, he observed, “continue[s] 
a never-ending journey to bridge the meaning of those words with 
the realities of our time.  For history tells us that while these 
truths may be self-evident [“that all men are created equal,”]51 
they’ve never been self-executing.”52  To be sure, Americans could 
and should strive to achieve the “abundance and liberty for all” 
advocated by Johnson in 1964. 53   But that “journey,” Obama 
emphasized, “is not complete until our gay brothers and sisters 
are treated like anyone else under the law – for if we are truly 
created equal, then surely the love we commit to one another must 
be equal as well.”54  The President of the United States of America 
had just used the first speech of his second term in office to 
endorse gay marriage. 
Literature which identifies a positive and principled 
relationship between the Great Society’s “abundance and liberty 
for all” imperative and the rights and liberties of gay and lesbian 
Americans is conspicuous by its absence, and for good reason.  
President Johnson’s “vision . . . embraced an array of legislative 
initiatives to improve Americans’ ‘quality of life,’” but racial and 
wealth inequities were the primary targets.55  At least one piece of 
Great Society legislation, however, specifically discriminated 
against members of the homosexual community.  The 1965 
Immigration and Nationality Act was one of that year’s “Big Four” 
legislative accomplishments. 56   It has been hailed by 
commentators as “right[ing] a long-rankling ethnic affront”57 and 
“signal[ing] the beginning of the era of liberalization”58  of the 
nation’s immigration policy.  In the view of President Johnson, it 
 
supra note 6. 
 51.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.2 (U.S. 1776). 
 52.  President Obama’s Second Inaugural Address, supra note 49.   
 53.  President Johnson’s Remarks at the University of Michigan, supra 
note 6. 
 54.  President Obama’s Second Inaugural Address, supra note 49.   
 55.  ANDREW, supra note 37, at 163. 
 56.  Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).  Together with educational 
aid reform, Medicare and Medicaid, and the Voting Rights Act.  See JAMES T. 
PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974 569 (1996). 
 57.  IRWIN UNGER, THE BEST OF INTENTIONS: THE TRIUMPHS AND FAILURES 
OF THE GREAT SOCIETY UNDER KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND NIXON 128 (1996).   
 58.  NORMAN L. ZUCKER & NAOMI FLINK ZUCKER, DESPERATE CROSSINGS: 
SEEKING REFUGE IN AMERICA 32 (1996). 
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“repair[ed] ‘a very deep and painful flaw in the fabric of American 
justice’” by abolishing the racially discriminatory provisions of the 
National Origins Act of 1924, which made ethnic origin the 
principal basis for immigration inclusion and exclusion. 59  
However, the 1965 Act also restated the homosexual exclusion 
provisions of previous laws, most notably the 1952 McCarran-
Walter Act.60  As Eithne Luibheid explains, homosexuals were not 
actually identified in that law: 
Instead, homosexual exclusion became rolled into the 
provision that barred entry by psychopathic personalities.  
A Senate report explained: ‘The Public Health Service has 
advised that the provision for the exclusion of aliens 
afflicted with psychopathic personality or a mental 
defect . . . is sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion 
of homosexuals and sex perverts.  This change in 
nomenclature is not to be constructed in any way as 
modifying the intent to exclude all aliens who are sexual 
deviants.’61 
Therefore, the 1965 law arguably was more discriminatory 
because it explicitly identified “sexual deviation” (homosexuality) 
as one of the grounds for denying admission into the United 
States.62  This state of affairs would not change until Congress 
 
 59.  DALLEK, supra note 38, at 228 (quoting President Johnson’s Remarks 
at the University of Michigan, supra note 6).  As David Reimers notes, 
however, the 1965 Act also deliberately imposed a system of de facto racial 
discrimination, regardless of the inclusivity note that was struck by its Great 
Society champions.  DAVID M. REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN DOOR: THE THIRD 
WORLD COMES TO AMERICA 70–73 (2d ed. 1992).  Almost three quarters of the 
immigration places were set aside for family reunification purposes.  See id.  
This purposely and disproportionately benefited immigrants from southern 
and eastern Europe because the racially exclusionary provisions of previous 
laws resulted in a very small number of colored families seeking to reunify.  
See id.  Although, as Hugh Davis Graham observes, over the course of the 
next forty years the vast majority of immigrants entering the U.S. under the 
provisions of the 1965 law came from Asia and Latin America.  See Hugh 
Davis Graham, The Great Society’s Civil Rights Legacy: Continuity 1, 
Discontinuity 3, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 365, 
368-69 (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2002). 
 60.  Immigration and Nationality Act § 18.   
 61.  EITHNE LUIBHEID, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING SEXUALITY AT THE 
BORDER 78 (2002) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1137, at 9 (1952)). 
 62.  Immigration and Nationality Act § 18; see also LUIBHEID, supra note 
61, at 78. 
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repealed the “sexual deviation” provision in 1990.63 
For gays and lesbians, the legislative vision of American 
society that emerged from the 1964 speech was one of exclusion.  
“[P]reserving the liberty of our citizens” so that they could “pursue 
the happiness”64 of which the Declaration of Independence spoke 
could only be achieved by reinforcing traditional notions of 
morality.  Homosexuals were viewed as dangerous deviants who 
posed a threat to the liberty enjoyed by ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ 
Americans.65  President Johnson spoke of “three places where we 
begin to build the Great Society – in our cities, in our countryside, 
and in our classrooms.”66   As the history of the oppression of 
homosexuals in the United States clearly indicates, in 1964 these 
were places where the average American believed that any great 
society was a straight society.67 
Over the next three decades, the majority of the LGBT 
community’s pleas for judicial intervention fell on deaf ears, 
especially at the nation’s highest court.68  The well-documented, 
and immensely significant expansion of civil rights and liberties 
by the Warren Court 69  (and, to a lesser extent, the Burger 
Court) 70  did not extend to those individuals experiencing 
discrimination based upon their sexual orientation.71  As Marc 
Stein convincingly demonstrates in Sexual Injustice, even the 
 
 63.  See LUIBHEID, supra note 61, at 96–99. 
 64.  President Johnson’s Remarks at the University of Michigan, supra 
note 6. 
 65.  See JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 316-18 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 3d ed. 2012) 
(1988).  
 66.  President Johnson’s Remarks at the University of Michigan, supra 
note 6. 
 67.  For a very good overview of the social, political, and legal obstacles 
faced by the LGBT community in the 1960s and 1970s (including, of course, 
the seminal 1969 Stonewall riots), and the birth of and struggles faced by the 
Gay Liberation Front, see D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 65, at 318–25. 
 68.  See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986), overruled 
by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 69.  For a good overview, see generally Henry J. Abraham, Justices and 
Justice: Reflections on the Warren Court’s Legacy, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND 
THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM, supra note 59, at 351. 
 70.  See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT 
WASN’T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). 
 71.  See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91. 
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Court’s decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 72  Loving v. 
Virginia,73 Eisenstadt v. Baird,74 and Roe v. Wade75 should be 
viewed as maintaining a body of “heteronormative doctrine.”76 
Decided in 1967, Boutilier v. INS77 was not the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s first gay rights decision, but like its predecessors and the 
cases mentioned above, its narrative was decidedly conservative 
and heteronormative. 78   As Stein demonstrates, however, 
Boutilier deserves the greater amount of attention because in it 
“the Court produced substantive majority and minority opinions,” 
and the case “was decided in the middle of the period in which the 
Court was announcing liberalizing decisions on birth control, 
obscenity, interracial marriage, and abortion.”79 
When Clive Michael Boutilier, a Canadian citizen, first 
crossed the border into the United States in 1955, he entered 
under the terms of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, which, as 
noted above, excluded homosexuals, labeling them “persons of 
constitutional psychopathic inferiority.”80  In 1964, in an affidavit 
that was part of his application for U.S. citizenship, he admitted 
that he had previously been arrested and charged (although, his 
case was ultimately dismissed) with engaging in sodomy with 
another man. 81   This admission resulted in the initiation of 
deportation proceedings under the terms of the 1952 Act.82  As 
Stein details, Justice Clark’s opinion for the Court upholding the 
decision of the INS to deport Boutilier repeatedly 
mischaracterized the facts of the case.83  And while that opinion 
clearly stated otherwise, Boutilier had “[a]t most . . . affirmed that 
he was ‘a homosexual’ in 1957,” two years after he first entered 
 
 72.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 73.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 74.  405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 75.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 76.  MARC STEIN, SEXUAL INJUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM 
GRISWOLD TO ROE 3 (2010). 
 77.  387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
 78.  See STEIN, supra note 76, at 58. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 119 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 136(a) (1946)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 81.  Id. at 119. 
 82.  Id. at 118; see also STEIN, supra note 76, at 61–66. 
 83.  STEIN, supra note 76, at 67. 
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the U.S.84  Neither Clark in his majority opinion, nor Justices 
Brennan and Douglas in their dissents, penned any language that 
exhibited any substantive understanding of the issues that in any 
way departed from the dominant heteronormative narrative.85  
That narrative and the judicial legacy of Boutilier persisted for (at 
least) another generation, as evidenced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.86 
As Emily Bazelon aptly observes, “Michael Hardwick may 
have the worst timing of anyone ever to come before the Supreme 
Court,”87 because his (unsuccessful) constitutional challenge to a 
Georgia criminal sodomy law came before the justices against the 
backdrop of the AIDS crisis, a crisis that “revealed how tenuous 
the progress of gay liberation had been.”88  Writing for the five-
justice majority, Justice Byron White produced an insensitive and 
tradition-oriented opinion that read the concepts of liberty and 
equality at a very narrow level of generality.89  In his view, the 
case did not involve broad, sweeping questions of individual, 
personal privacy and autonomy.90  Quite the opposite.  In White’s 
words, the question in the case was “whether the Federal 
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy.”91  White rejected, out of hand, any claim that 
such a right could be found in the Constitution’s text.92  It was not 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”93  And it 
could not be considered “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”94  Therefore, Hardwick’s claim failed all of the standard 
 
 84.  Id. at 72. 
 85.  Id. at 57–93.  For Stein’s discussion of the dissenting opinions in 
Boutilier, see id. at 82–91. 
 86.  478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003).  
 87.  Emily Bazelon, Why Advancing Gay Rights is All About Good 
Timing, SLATE (October 19, 2012, 5:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2012/10/the_supreme_court_s_t
errible_decision_in_bowers_v_hardwick_was_a_product.html.  
 88.  D’EMILIO AND FREEDMAN, supra note 65, at 354; see also id. 354–61. 
 89.  See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 
(1977)). 
 94.  Id. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), 
overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). 
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tests used by the Court in individual liberty cases.  Any argument 
to the contrary was, “at best, facetious.”95 
The week after the justices met in conference to decide 
Bowers, Justice Lewis F. Powell changed his position, thereby 
casting the crucial fifth vote to uphold the Georgia law.96  Powell 
agonized over the case.  Ultimately, the staid, conservative 
Virginian was unable to comprehend the nature of homosexual 
attraction and, consequently, the importance and meaning of 
Hardwick’s rights claim.97   Famously, four years later, Powell 
publicly confessed that he considered himself to have voted (or 
switched to voting) the wrong way in Bowers: “‘I think I probably 
made a mistake in that one,’” he said.98   By contrast, Justice 
Kennedy (President’s Reagan’s third choice to replace the retiring 
Powell)99 viewed Bowers as misguided from the day it was decided 
(as he would later get the chance to say in the pages of the U.S. 
Reports in his majority opinion in Lawrence).100  As he explained 
to a gathering of Canadian jurists at Stanford University in July 
1986: 
[M]any argue that a just society grants a right to engage 
in homosexual conduct.  If that view is accepted, the 
Bowers decision in effect says the State of Georgia has the 
right to make a wrong decision—wrong in the sense that 
it violates some people’s views of rights in a just 
society.101 
Upon the announcement of Kennedy’s Supreme Court 
nomination many gay rights advocates looked past that speech.  
They saw little reason to be optimistic about pressing their rights 
claims before President’s Reagan’s third choice to replace the 
 
 95.  Id. at 194. 
 96.  See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A 
BIOGRAPHY 523–24 (1994). 
 97.  See id. at 521–22. 
 98.  Id. at 530 (quoting Lewis. F. Powell Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme 
Court, Lecture at New York University Law School (Oct. 18, 1990)). 
 99.  See KNOWLES, supra note 3, at 6. 
 100.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 101.  Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Stanford 
Lectures at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies: 
Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of Judicial Restraint (July 24, 1986 to 
Aug. 1, 1986).  For my more detailed discussion of this, see KNOWLES, supra 
note 3, at 115–16, and more generally ch. 3. 
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retiring Powell.  For example, at the time of Kennedy’s 
confirmation hearings, law professor Arthur S. Leonard 
commented in the New York Native that, “Kennedy seems rather 
obtuse on important gay issues, and indeed must be counted a 
likely vote against us on most matters likely to come before the 
Supreme Court.”102  Kennedy’s “appointment should come as no 
cause for joy among gay people,” Leonard concluded.103  For “it 
seems unlikely that gays alone can block his confirmation, and 
equally unlikely that Ronald Reagan would appoint anyone who 
would have voted differently in [Bowers].”104  A copy of the article 
accompanied the testimony of Jeffrey Levi, Executive Director of 
the National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.  Levi “look[ed] to Judge Kennedy’s record in 
hope of finding indication that his definition of American society 
and the Constitution is more inclusive” than that of the Bowers 
majority.105  “Unfortunately,” he concluded, “little hope can be 
found.”106  Levi and Leonard both focused upon the small number 
of gay rights-related opinions Kennedy had penned since 1975, 
during his time on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.107  As I 
explained in my book, a close reading of those opinions, together 
with Kennedy’s pre-Supreme Court nomination speeches 
(especially his post-Bowers Stanford speech), does not support 
Levi and Leonard’s conclusions.108  Those materials make it clear 
that Kennedy’s transformation into “a jurist who treats gay rights 
claims seriously”109 did not suddenly take place one day in 1996 
 
 102.  Arthur S. Leonard, Kennedy and the Gays, Again, N.Y. NATIVE, Dec. 
7, 1987, at 430, 430, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRG-
KENNEDY/pdf/GPO-CHRG-KENNEDY-2-3-4-8.pdf.  
 103.  Id. at 431. 
 104.  Id.; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 105.  Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 426 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy Hearing] (statement 
of Jeffery Levi, Executive Director, National Gay & Lesbian Task Force). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See generally id.; Leonard, supra note 102.   
 108.  KNOWLES, supra note 3, at 93–98. 
 109.  Artemus Ward, The Gay Rights Jurisprudence of Anthony Kennedy: 
An Institutional Analysis 6 (Apr. 15, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) 
(presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, Ill.,), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/ 
p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/3/4/6/p83460_index.html?phpsessid=a5dae1
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when, ten years after Bowers, he announced the Court’s decision 
in Romer. 
In that case, the Court struck down a state constitutional 
amendment that singled out discrimination based upon sexual 
orientation as something from which people could not seek 
governmental protection.110  “It is not within our constitutional 
tradition to enact laws of this sort,” wrote Justice Kennedy.111  
“Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,” he continued, “is the 
principle that government and each of its parts remain open on 
impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.”112  Seven years 
later, the justices went much further, issuing the landmark ruling 
in Lawrence v. Texas, holding unconstitutional a state law 
criminalizing homosexual sodomy (and, consequently, overturning 
Bowers).113  And then, exactly ten years later, came the decision 
in Windsor114—liberal progress indeed, and progress arguably 
entirely consistent with the principles embodied in the concept of 
the Great Society. 
III. “[T]HE MEDIATING IDEA OF ARBITRARINESS”115 – OR, THE 
FEDERALISM ROAD NOT TAKEN IN WINDSOR 
In the months following the decision in Romer, Jeffrey Rosen 
interviewed Pete Wilson, former Governor of California and U.S. 
Senator, for a New Yorker profile of Justice Kennedy.116  One of 
the ways in which Wilson described the jurisprudence of his good 
friend was as follows: “I think it strikes him as terribly unfair that 
anyone’s individual potential should be in any way limited by 
their being classed as a member of a group, and treated in 
 
b8705e4e50460854ae9b9b5af4.  In this paper, Professor Ward similarly 
argues that Kennedy’s Ninth Circuit opinions were less hostile towards gay 
rights claims than the analyses of Levi and Leonard led them to conclude.  
See generally id.; see also KNOWLES, supra note 3, at 95–98. 
 110.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). 
 111.  Id. at 633. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 114.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 115.  William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in 
THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47, 66 
(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992). 
 116.  See Jeffery Rosen, The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 82, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1996/11/11/the-agonizer.  
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accordance with their group membership, rather than what they 
deserve to receive as individuals.”117 
It is difficult to find a more astute summation of Justice 
Kennedy’s concept of equality.  That is why I chose to open 
chapter three of my book, The Tie Goes to Freedom, with this 
quotation. 118   Wilson’s words perfectly describe the central 
animating principle of the main opinions analyzed in that 
chapter—Kennedy’s writings for the Court in Romer and 
Lawrence.119 Wilson’s words also can explain the Court’s opinion 
for the five-justice majority in Windsor. 
Responding to Windsor, Michael Dorf, a former clerk for 
Associate Justice Kennedy, quipped that, “[i]f Bill Clinton was ‘the 
first Black president,’ Anthony Kennedy has now firmly secured 
his place in history as ‘the first gay Justice.’”120  To some extent, 
this reflects the fact that in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor 
Justice Kennedy was the key member of the Court—the 
ideological centrist whose vote was essential for the lawyers to 
secure in these cases.  However, as I explained in my book, and 
discuss below, Kennedy’s vote was never in doubt.121  Therefore, 
Dorf’s assertion is better understood as being attributable to the 
fact that Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in each of these 
cases. 
Ten years ago, Professor Dorf observed that Kennedy’s 
authorship of Romer gave an air of predictability to Justice 
Stevens’s decision to assign Kennedy the task of writing the 
majority opinion in Lawrence.122  “The writing was, if not on the 
wall, at least in the vicinity of the wall,” remarked Dorf.123  There 
is every reason to believe that Stevens was aware of the extent to 
which his colleague felt passionately about extending liberty and 
 
 117.  Id. at 86 (quoting Peter Wilson, 36th Governor, California). 
 118.  KNOWLES, supra note 3, at 89. 
 119.  Id. at 89–125. 
 120.  Michael C. Dorf, First Takes on DOMA and Prop 8 Rulings, DORF ON 
LAW (June 26, 2013, 10:58 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/06/first-
takes-on-doma-and-prop-8-rulings.html.  
 121.  KNOWLES, supra note 3, at 91. 
 122.  See generally Richard Brust, The Man In The Middle, A.B.A. J., Oct. 
2003, at 24.  Stevens was acting in his capacity as the Senior Associate 
Justice in the majority. 
 123.  Id. at 24 (quoting Michael Dorf, Professor, Cornell University Law 
School). 
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equality to all, regardless of their sexual orientation.  In Lawrence 
(and, indeed, in Romer seven years earlier), Kennedy did not 
“agonize” over the case, a character trait he has repeatedly been 
accused of exhibiting in his judicial decision-making.124  Powell 
“waited and waffled” when deciding Bowers.125  By contrast, in 
Lawrence, as he “later told Thurgood Marshall’s wife,” Kennedy 
considered “the right result” to be “so obvious” that he penned the 
opinion “over the course of one weekend.”126  If the writing in 
Lawrence was “in the vicinity of the wall,”127 after the justices 
voted in Windsor the identity of the majority opinion’s author was 
surely etched in indelible ink.  As the Senior Associate Justice in 
the Windsor majority, Kennedy likely did not hesitate to self-
assign the opinion.  As Jeffrey Rosen observes, “[e]ver since 
Justice Kennedy held in Lawrence v. Texas that moral disapproval 
of homosexuality isn’t a legitimate purpose for any law, the 
writing was on the wall for DOMA.”128  And as Windsor made 
clear, Kennedy “not only accepts, but welcomes the task of writing 
majestic opinions affirming the dignity of gay persons and 
couples.”129 
Kennedy’s assessment of section 3 of DOMA is blunt and 
unequivocal in Windsor: its “principal purpose is to impose 
inequality.”130  DOMA tells Mark and Mary that when they got 
married in Des Moines they were immediately entitled to a 
plethora of federal benefits by virtue of being husband and wife; it 
simultaneously informs Mark and Mary’s Iowan neighbors, 
Sandra and Sarah, that they will be denied those very same 
benefits simply because they chose to enter into a lawful (in the 
eyes of Iowa) marital relationship with a person of the same sex.  
As Edith Windsor remarked about her late wife Thea Spyer (upon 
whose death Windsor was saddled with a $353,053 federal tax 
 
 124.  See Rosen, supra note 116, at 82–86.   
 125.  JEFFRIES, supra note 96, at 514. 
 126.  JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 37 (2007).   
 127.  Brust, supra note 122, at 24. 
 128.  Jeffrey Rosen & Michael McConnell, Debating the Court’s Gay 
Marriage Decisions, NEW REPUBLIC (June 26, 2013), http://www.newrepublic. 
com/article/113646/supreme-court-strikes-down-doma-dismisses-prop-8-
debate. 
 129.  Dorf, supra note 120. 
 130.  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013). 
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bill): “‘If Thea was a Theo, I wouldn’t have had to pay.’”131  Or, to 
use the description employed by Justice Ginsburg during the 
Windsor oral argument, DOMA tells Mark and Mary that their 
marriage is “full” while simultaneously informing Sandra and 
Sarah that their union is nothing more than “skim milk.”132  This 
inequality lies at the jurisprudential heart of Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Windsor—it reminds us that the parties harmed by 
DOMA, the parties deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed 
right to equal liberty, are the gay and lesbian individuals who 
wish to “marry and so live with pride in themselves and their 
union and in a status of equality with all other married 
persons.”133  Individuals who wish to marry and to give “further 
protection and dignity”134 to the “personal bond”135 that is neither 
created by nor dependent for its existence on government action. 
This is clear in the Windsor opinion passage that Professor 
Dorf astutely describes as “the money quote from the majority”:136 
 DOMA undermines both the public and private 
significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it 
tells those couples, and all the world, that their otherwise 
valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.  This 
places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being 
in a second-tier marriage.  The differentiation demeans 
the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the 
Constitution protects, and whose relationship the State 
has sought to dignify.  And it humiliates tens of 
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex 
couples.  The law in question makes it even more difficult 
for the children to understand the integrity and closeness 
of their own family and its concord with other families in 
 
 131.  Jim Dwyer, She Waited 40 Years to Marry, Then When Her Wife 
Died, the Tax Bill Came, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/06/08/nyregion/woman-says-same-sex-marriage-bias-cost-her-over-
500000.html?_r=0 (quoting Interview with Edith Windsor, in N.Y., N.Y. 
(June 6, 2012)). 
 132.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 71, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-
307), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/12-307_jnt1.pdf.  
 133.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
 134.  Id. at 2692. 
 135.  Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)). 
 136.  Dorf, supra note 120. 
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their community and in their daily lives. 
 Under DOMA, same-sex married couples have their 
lives burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible 
and public ways.  By its great reach, DOMA touches 
many aspects of married and family life, from the 
mundane to the profound.137 
It is here that we see the crucial theme of the opinion: it is 
irrational, demeaning (privately and publicly), and, therefore, 
unconstitutional to treat any individual differently because of 
their sexual orientation.138 
A. Justice Kennedy on Federalism 
The crucial theme is obscured if one focuses on the federalism 
references.  This is not to say, however, that it is impossible to 
understand why some commentators latched onto those 
references.  The vertical separation of powers in the American 
system of government is, after all, a subject about which Kennedy 
has spoken passionately and often throughout his judicial 
career. 139   Kennedy has called federalism the “most brilliant 
political theory breakthrough of many centuries,” a central “part 
of the dynamic of freedom that the Framers insisted upon”;140 and 
in his solo concurrence in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton he 
famously labeled it “our Nation’s own discovery.”141  When the 
Framers conceived of federalism, Kennedy wrote, they “split the 
atom of sovereignty.”142 
 
 137.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (citation omitted). 
 138.  See id. 
 139.  See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 140.  Justice Kennedy, Life in the Supreme Court (C-SPAN television 
broadcast Dec. 14, 1999), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?154155-
1/life-supreme-court.  
 141.  514 U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 142.  Id. at 838–39.  Kennedy has quoted the phrase “split the atom of 
sovereignty” in one other opinion.  See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 
(1999).  Justice Kennedy’s colleagues have also quoted this phrase.  See, e.g., 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Saenz v. Roe, 
526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17 (1999).  While U.S. Term Limits marked the first 
occasion in which Justice Kennedy used this atomic metaphor in a Supreme 
Court opinion, it was neither a new understanding of federalism for him, nor 
a description conceived by one of the individuals clerking for him during the 
October 1994 Term; it made an appearance in at least two of the speeches 
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Speaking to the Sacramento Chapter of the Rotary Club in 
October 1987 (six weeks before his Supreme Court nomination), 
Kennedy emphasized that his views about federalism were not 
borne of historic idol worship. 143   He asked the audience a 
rhetorical question: “Do we have simply an attachment to 
federalism because it has some antique, traditional attributes; do 
we wish simply to honor the memories of Madison and 
Hamilton[?]”144  His answer was an unequivocal “no.”145  Kennedy 
explained that his deep passionate commitment is not to 
federalism qua federalism.146  Rather, of principal importance to 
him is the “underlying, fundamental, essential, ethical, moral 
value” that is “reflect[ed]” in the concept of federalism. 147  
Kennedy continued, 
The value is that it is wrong, legally wrong, morally 
wrong, for a person to delegate authority over his or her 
own life to an entity which is so far removed from his or 
her ability to control it that he or she parts with the 
essential freedom that inheres in every human 
personality.148 
None of this is a secret, and it has been well documented by 
scholars.149  Additionally, during the oral argument in Windsor, 
 
that he gave before joining the Supreme Court.  See Anthony M. Kennedy, 
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at the Sacramento Chapter of 
the Rotary Club, Sacramento, Cal.: Rotary Speech 7 (October 15, 1987) 
(transcript available in the Committee on the Judiciary, Judiciary 
Nomination files, 100th Cong.) [hereinafter Justice Kennedy Rotary Club 
Address]; Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address 
at the Historical Soc’y for the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., S.F., Cal.: 
Federalism: The Theory and the Reality, Speech 3 (October 26, 1987) 
(transcript available in the Committee on the Judiciary, Judiciary 
Nomination files, 100th Cong.). 
 143.  Justice Kennedy Rotary Club Address, supra note 142.  
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  For example, I have discussed it on various occasions.  See generally 
Helen J. Knowles, A Dialogue on Death Penalty Dignity, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & 
CRIM. JUST. 115 (2011); Helen J. Knowles, The Constitutional “Dignity” of 
States and Individuals (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Knowles, Constitutional “Dignity”].  Examples of other 
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Justice Kennedy’s comments indicated that federalism was likely 
the principal lens through which he was viewing the issues in the 
case – that, the “federalism interest at stake here” was of 
considerable importance.150  It was, therefore, unsurprising that 
the Windsor decision occasioned several commentators to focus 
upon Kennedy’s references to federalism. 151   However, the 
aforementioned crucial equal liberty theme of the opinion is 
obscured when one focuses on the federalism components of the 
opinion, as demonstrated by the following critique of the analyses 
offered by Professors Barnett and Hills. 
B. Analyzing Barnett 
In his SCOTUSblog commentary on Windsor titled 
Federalism marries liberty in the DOMA decision, Randy Barnett 
contends that Kennedy employed “‘federalism’ logic, but with a 
significant twist that converted it from an enumerated powers 
[argument] into a ‘liberty’ argument.”152  Kennedy, he says, “used 
the interference with the traditional province of states to regulate 
marriage to justify heightened scrutiny under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”153  Barnett argues that it is 
this “novel” component of Kennedy’s opinion that “seems to have 
confused the dissenters.”154  Barnett describes the “logic” of the 
Justice’s opinion in the following way: 
(1) The definition and regulation of the right to marry is 
traditionally the province of states (and is not among the 
enumerated powers of Congress[)]. 
(2) When it enacted DOMA Congress was demonstrably 
intending to and did interfere with this traditional 
 
scholars’ works include: FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 135–39 
(2009); Cynthia L. Cates, Splitting the Atom of Sovereignty: Term Limits, 
Inc.’s Conflicting Views of Popular Autonomy in a Federal Republic, 26 
PUBLIUS 127, 127, 137–40 (1996); Earl M. Maltz, Justice Kennedy’s Vision of 
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 761, 761–62 (2000). 
 150.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 59, 70–71, 75–76, 
82. 
 151.  See, e.g., Alvare supra note 25; Barnett, supra note 21; Somin, supra 
note 26. 
 152.  Barnett, supra note 21. 
 153.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 154.  Id.  
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function of states to define and regulate the right to 
marry . . . 
(3) Therefore, the Court will use heightened scrutiny to 
evaluate the rationality of DOMA’s imposed definition of 
marriage[.] 
(4) This unusual deviation from the past practice of 
respecting state law definitions of marriage was 
improperly motivated by animus.155 
The first two components of Barnett’s interpretation of the 
logic of Kennedy’s opinion are uncontroversial, and do indeed 
speak to the federalism aspects of the opinion.  However, if we 
accept parts three and four of Barnett’s interpretation, then we 
reach a troubling and controversial conclusion.  For, those parts of 
his interpretation indicate that Kennedy’s opinion must be viewed 
as a significant jurisprudential departure from both Romer and 
Lawrence, an illiberal departure that sets back rather than 
advances the rights and liberties of the LGBT community.156  It 
cannot, under this interpretation, be viewed as an “[individual] 
‘liberty’ argument,” as Barnett suggests. 157   This is because 
“under Justice Kennedy’s reasoning” as Barnett reads it, “it is the 
fact that states have recognized same-sex marriage that gives rise 
to heightened judicial scrutiny” of DOMA.158  In other words, the 
harmed parties are states that have recognized same-sex marriage 
rather than those states’ citizens.  Barnett is right that in this 
case “state law is being used to identify a protected liberty or right 
within its borders”; 159  in this respect, his interpretation can 
peacefully coexist with the concept of state-conferred dignity, as 
discussed below.  However, Barnett’s interpretation is in tension 
with the human dignity references because it indicates that 
heightened scrutiny will be given to DOMA for its interference 
with the legal recognition of individual liberty that a State chose to 
confer.160  Consequently, it is also difficult to reconcile it with the 
 
 155.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 156.  See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 157.  See Barnett, supra note 21. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id.  
 160.  See id.   
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true heart of Kennedy’s Windsor opinion. 
1. “It’s a strange bird,”161 but is it “‘rational basis plus or 
intermediate scrutiny minus’”?162 
Perhaps a more obvious flaw in Barnett’s interpretation is his 
conclusion that the Court in Windsor subjected DOMA to 
“heightened scrutiny.”163  Admittedly, Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
does not contain any statement explicitly identifying the standard 
of scrutiny employed to assess the law’s constitutionality (just as 
such discussions were conspicuous by their absence in his opinions 
in Romer and Lawrence).164  This has created doctrinal confusion 
that more than one jurist has lamented165  – including Justice 
 
 161.  Josh Gerstein, The DOMA decision ripple effect, POLITICO (June 26, 
2013, 8:49 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/doma-decision-gay-
marriage-ripple-effect-93479.html (quoting Kevin Walsh, Professor, 
University of Richmond; Former Law Clerk to Justice Antonin G. Scalia, U.S. 
Supreme Court). 
 162.  Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (Nos. 12-2335-
cv(L), 12-2435(Con.))). 
 163.  Barnett, supra note 21. 
 164.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–96 (2013); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562–79 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 623–36  (1996). 
 165.  Take, for example, the comments that formed part of the opinion 
penned by Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs for the Second Circuit in Windsor, 699 
F.3d at 180–81.  This was the first federal circuit opinion to hold that 
“heightened scrutiny” was the relevant standard of review in a gay rights 
case.  See id. at 181.  In so holding, the Second Circuit cited four factors, 
based on Supreme Court precedent, to be considered in determining whether 
to extend the “quasi-suspect class” designation to a new group.  Id. at 181–82.  
The Jacobs-led majority was unequivocal in its conclusion that sexual 
orientation was such a classification, stating:  
In this case, all four factors justify heightened scrutiny: A) 
homosexuals as a group have historically endured persecution and 
discrimination; B) homosexuality has no relation to aptitude or 
ability to contribute to society; C) homosexuals are a discernible 
group with non-obvious distinguishing characteristics, especially in 
the subset of those who enter same-sex marriages; and D) the class 
remains a politically weakened minority.  
Id.  (emphasis added).  (I am grateful to Dan Pinello for bringing this to my 
attention).  This followed Jacobs’s observation that “no permutation of 
rational basis review is needed if heightened scrutiny is available, as it is in 
this case.”  Id. at 181.  Jacobs also expressed frustration at the doctrinal 
uncertainty caused by the fuzzy standards of scrutiny in opinions such as 
Romer and Lawrence:  
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Scalia whose dissent in Windsor indicated that he would apply 
nothing more than rational basis review.166  This was a decision, 
he concluded, that his colleagues in the majority agreed with – 
well, at least, “[a]s nearly as I can tell,” wrote Scalia, “the 
Court . . .  does not apply strict scrutiny, and [while] its central 
propositions are taken from rational-basis cases . . . the Court 
certainly does not apply anything that resembles that deferential 
framework.”167  So how, then, might we explain Barnett’s arrival 
 
[S]everal courts have read the Supreme Court’s recent cases in this 
area to suggest that rational basis review should be more demanding 
when there are “historic patterns of disadvantage suffered by the 
group adversely affected by the statute.”  Proceeding along those 
lines, the district court in this case and the First Circuit in 
Massachusetts both adopted more exacting rational basis review for 
DOMA.  At argument, counsel for BLAG wittily characterized this 
form of analysis as “rational basis plus or intermediate scrutiny 
minus.”  The Supreme Court has not expressly sanctioned such 
modulation in the level of rational basis review; discussion pro and 
con has largely been confined to concurring and dissenting opinions.  
We think it is safe to say that there is some doctrinal instability in 
this area.  
Id. at 180–81 (citations omitted) (quoting Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 162, at 16)).  Justice Scalia has also been deeply 
critical of Kennedy’s failure to walk the walk, but not talk the talk for 
fundamental rights and suspect classes.  See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  “The Court evidently agrees that ‘rational basis’ . . . is 
the governing standard,” Scalia wrote in his dissent in Romer, but in the 
subsequent pages of his dissent, he engaged in a lengthy expression of his 
incredulity at Kennedy’s inability to find a rational basis for Amendment 2 of 
the Colorado Constitution, which was the provision struck down in Romer.  
Id. at 639–41.  Was there a “legitimate rational basis for the substance of the 
constitutional amendment”?  Id. at 640.  “[T]he answer is so obviously yes,” 
wrote Scalia.  Id.  The only irrationality lay in holding otherwise, as the 
Court did.  The doctrinal errors were no less visible seven years later in 
Lawrence, wherein the Court proceeded to employ “an unheard-of form of 
rational-basis review” to strike down the Texas ban on homosexual sodomy. 
539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 166.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 167.  Id. (emphasis added).  Scalia ultimately concludes:  
The majority opinion need not get into the strict-vs.-rational-basis 
scrutiny question, and need not justify its holding under either, 
because it says that DOMA is unconstitutional as “a deprivation of 
the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution”; that it violates “basic due process” principles; and that 
it inflicts an “injury and indignity” of a kind that denies “an essential 
part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.”  The majority 
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at the conclusion that Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor employs 
“heightened scrutiny”?  The opinion twice hints at the standard of 
review it is applying.  DOMA “is invalid,” writes Kennedy in the 
final paragraph, because “no legitimate purpose overcomes the 
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the 
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and 
dignity.” 168   This strongly indicates that the Court had used 
rational basis review.  In support of part three of his summary, 
Barnett points to the other statement in the opinion that suggests 
a standard of scrutiny: “In determining whether a law is motived 
by an improper animus or purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations of an 
unusual character’ especially require careful consideration.” 169  
Other commentators agree that this “sounds more like heightened 
scrutiny,”170 an observation that some also made about identical 
language in Romer.171  Ultimately, however, this statement does 
 
never utters the dreaded(?) words “substantive due process,” perhaps 
sensing the disrepute into which that doctrine has fallen, but that is 
what those statements mean.  Yet the opinion does not argue that 
same-sex marriage is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,” a claim that would of course be quite absurd. So would 
the further suggestion (also necessary, under our substantive-due-
process precedents) that a world in which DOMA exists is one bereft 
of  “ ‘ordered liberty.’ ” 
Id. at 2706–07 (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 2695, 2693, 2692 (majority 
opinion); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).  However, 
it is not clear how this discussion of the ills of substantive due process is 
related to the use (or not) of a specific standard of review since either 
identifying the rational basis for a law, or subjecting that law to strict 
scrutiny, is a judicial approach routinely used in both equal protection and 
due process cases. 
 168.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added). 
 169.  Barnett, supra note 21 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692). 
 170.  Julie A. Nice, And Marriage Makes Three: A Gay Rights Trilogy 
Secures a Legacy, HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/julie-a-nice/and-marriage-makes-three-_b_3537739.html. 
 171.  See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Equal Protection From Eminent Domain: 
Protecting the Home of Olech’s Class of One, 55 LOY. L. REV. 697, 745 (2009); 
Manuel Possolo, Note, Morals Legislation After Lawrence: Can States 
Criminalize the Sale of Sexual Devices?, 65 STAN. L. REV. 565, 577–79 (2013).  
One wonders whether it was coincidental that in 2011 the Obama 
Administration issued a statement indicating that “[a]fter careful 
consideration . . . the President has concluded that given a number of factors, 
including a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on 
sexual orientation should be subject to a more heightened standard of 
scrutiny.”  Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the 
Defense of Marriage Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www. 
KNOWLESFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  3:24 PM 
2015] TAKING JUSTICE KENNEDY SERIOUSLY 51 
not support subjecting DOMA to “heightened scrutiny.” 
In her commentary for the Huffington Post, Law Professor 
Julie A. Nice correctly observed that “[j]ust as he had in Romer,” 
in Windsor Kennedy once again “simply elided the tired tiers that 
characterize judicial scrutiny as strict, intermediate, or 
rationality-based.  He similarly avoided the standard formula for 
determining whether a right is fundamental, apparently finding 
no need to reach that analysis, just as he had done in 
Lawrence.”172  This begs the question, “why?”  The answer to that 
inquiry also serves as further support for the conclusion that 
federalism played nothing more than a “fairly extended, but 
ultimately inconclusive and nondispositive” role in Windsor.173 
Employment of rational basis review does not have to be a 
“conservative” judicial approach, as some commentators have 
described it.174  Admittedly, it might seem “conservative” because 
when the government’s actions are merely required to be 
“rationally related” to a “legitimate government interest” those 
actions will almost always be constitutional.  Indeed, one might 
say that typically rational basis review is a “feeble” level of 
scrutiny, in both “theory” and “fact.” 175   Justice Kennedy’s 
opinions in gay rights cases, however, consistently employ a flavor 
of rational basis review that is anything but feeble.  It is a 
standard of scrutiny accurately described as “rational basis with 
bite.”176  This reformulation of rational basis in equal protection 
cases emerged in the 1970s.  It was borne of the frustration of 
several justices who saw inadequacies in the existing approach of 
providing higher levels of scrutiny to those groups identified by a 
 
justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html (emphasis added).  
 172.  Nice, supra note 170. 
 173.  Alvare, supra note 25. 
 174.  See, e.g., John Schwartz, In Same-Sex Ruling, an Eye on the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/ 
us/06assess.html?_r=0.  
 175.  This is a play on the words recently used by Justice Kennedy to 
assert that it is important to prevent the standard of strict scrutiny from 
becoming “strict in theory, but feeble in fact.”  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).  
 176.  See Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court can strike down marriage 
restrictions under rational-basis review, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 23, 2011, 8:38 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/why-the-court-can-strike-down-
marriage-restrictions-under-rational-basis-review/.  
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majority of the Court as “suspect classes.”177  As a result, the 
Court began to “use the [equal protection] clause as an 
interventionist tool without resorting to the strict scrutiny 
language.”178   In Kennedy’s opinions in Romer, Lawrence, and 
now Windsor, this revised standard of review has been employed 
in a way that is anything but “conservative.”179  Time and again, 
Kennedy has stated his belief that there can be no rational basis 
for discrimination based upon sexual orientation.180 
Some commentators have suggested that Kennedy exhibits 
particular empathy for members of the gay community. 181  
Inevitably, efforts have been made to identify a biographical 
explanation for the Justice’s embrace of gay rights.  For example, 
a 2012 Time magazine cover article pointed to the likely influence 
of Gordon Schaber upon Kennedy’s gay rights views.182  Schaber, 
who was Dean of the McGeorge School of Law in Sacramento 
(where Kennedy has taught, in various capacities, since the 
1960s), was “living the difficult secret life of a gay man in 1970s 
America.”183  Similarly, in a Reuters article that appeared in the 
Huffington Post on the eve of the Court’s October 2012 Term, Joan 
Biskupic suggested that interactions with gay Court employees 
might have positively affected the Justice’s views of the rights 
 
 177.  See id.; see also Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972).  
 178.  Gunther, supra note 177, at 12.  I also discuss the evolution of this 
standard in KNOWLES, supra note 3, at 89-125.  
 179.  See Schwartz, supra note 174. 
 180.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569–78 (2003); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–37 (1996). 
 181.  See, e.g., Lawrence C. Levine, Justice Kennedy’s “Gay Agenda”: 
Romer, Lawrence, and the Struggle for Marriage Equality 1–2 (Apr. 6, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (presented at a symposium sponsored by McGeorge 
Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2230626; Dahlia Lithwick, It’s About the Empathy, Stupid, SLATE 
(May 10, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2012/05/barack_obama_s_decision_to_support_gay_marriage_
was_a_rare_act_of_empathy_in_this_presidential_election_.html. 
 182.  Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, What Will Justice Kennedy 
Do?, TIME, June 18, 2012, available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,2116699,00.html.  
 183.   Id.  This theory is also discussed in Tony Mauro, At Center of Gay 
Rights Movement, A Justice Rises, NAT’L L. J., July 8, 2013, at 7, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleSCI.jsp?id=1202609568427.  
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belonging to the LGBT community.184  Of course, only Justice 
Kennedy can really know (if, indeed, he does know) what 
motivates him to cast his vote in sexual orientation cases and 
write the judicial opinions that he does.  However, all of this 
misses a vital point about Justice Kennedy’s equal protection 
jurisprudence.  On one level, Professor Dorf’s quip is accurate.  
“Anthony Kennedy has now firmly secured his place in history as 
‘the first gay Justice’” 185  because of his opinions in Romer, 
Lawrence, and Windsor.  But, from Kennedy’s perspective, he is 
merely trying to guarantee equal treatment for all.  In other 
words, Pete Wilson was right, it does “strike . . . [Justice Kennedy] 
as terribly unfair that anyone’s individual potential should be in 
any way limited by their being classed as a member of a group, 
and treated in accordance with their group membership, rather 
than what they deserve to receive as individuals.”186 
C. Analyzing Hills 
“‘[D]iscriminations of an unusual character especially 
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they 
are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’”187 
Professor Barnett used this quotation from Romer to support 
part three of his Windsor summary.188  This quotation made two 
appearances in the Windsor opinion; however, Barnett’s reference 
was only to the second appearance, a shortened version of the 
 
 184.  Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court On Gay Rights: Will Acceptance By 
The High Court Influence Rulings?, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2012, 9:00 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/09/supreme-court-gay-rights_n_ 
1868321.html.  There is some academic support for this so-called “contact 
theory,” but the literature also emphasizes the multitudinous factors that 
must be accounted for when seeking to explain how social interactions may or 
may not affect a person’s attitudes about something.  See generally Gregory 
M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, “Some of My Best Friends”: Intergroup 
Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Gay Men 
and Lesbians, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1996). 
 185.  Alex Seitz-Wald, Anthony Kennedy: “The first gay justice,” SALON 
(June 26, 2013, 1:39 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/26/anthony_ 
kennedy_the_first_gay_justice/ (quoting Dorf, supra note 120). 
 186.  Rosen & McConnell, supra note 128 (emphasis added) (quoting Peter 
Wilson, 36th Governor, California). 
 187.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
 188.  Barnett, supra note 21. 
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first.189  The entire quotation, printed above, includes in italics 
the text that did not appear in the second reference.  That 
additional text is important because it speaks to the heart of 
Kennedy’s opinion and helps us to understand the shortcomings of 
the second federalism argument critiqued in this Article, the 
PrawfsBlawg commentary authored by Rick Hills.190 
Professor Hills claims that Kennedy’s opinion is a “recognition 
that state law can define, at least in part, the scope of federal 
constitutional rights by (for instance) defining what constitutes an 
arbitrary classification under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
clause.”191  As a result, “the feds are more constrained by national 
constitutional rights than are the states.”192  The justification for 
such an approach – that “individual states can go different ways 
in deciding whether a particular classification is arbitrary” – 
reflects the idea of the states as little laboratories.193   In the 
famous words of Justice Brandeis, “[i]t is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”194  Justice Kennedy believes that the federal system of 
government in the United States is a well-functioning system 
when “two governments” succeed in providing the populace with 
“more liberty than one.”195  The dignity of individual citizens will 
be enhanced when there is at least one level of government that, 
in theory at least, does not seem alien, detached, and disinterested 
in hearing about, respecting, and protecting the interests of its 
citizens.196  In this respect, therefore, Professor Hills’s conclusion 
supports a federalism interpretation of Kennedy’s Windsor 
opinion.  However, it is a flawed interpretation because – again 
reflecting Romer and Lawrence – Kennedy makes it very clear 
 
 189.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692–93; Barnett, supra note 21. 
 190.  Hills, supra note 32. 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id.  
 194.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting).  Interestingly, Justice Kennedy has never used this quotation 
in an opinion he has authored. 
 195.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 196.  See id. 
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that treating someone differently because of their sexual 
orientation is automatically an unconstitutional, “arbitrary” 
classification.197 
1. Why Justice Scalia is Correct – Windsor was a Decision that 
Did Not Bark 
As Professor Hills astutely observes, Windsor holds “that 
state law can define, at least in part, the scope of federal 
constitutional rights,”198 but his commentary fails to put sufficient 
emphasis on the “at least in part” component of this conclusion.  
He is more circumspect than Barnett; the question he asks is 
whether the “ghost” of Justice Harlan “smile[d] today, because 
Windsor vindicated” something that he advocated with particular 
vigor. 199   By this he means the second Justice Harlan’s 
commitment to “the idea that rights against the federal 
government ought to be construed more broadly than analogous 
rights against the state government.”200  The answer he gives is 
equivocal.  “Hints of Harlan’s theory” may “have been cropping up 
in a variety of [Supreme Court] opinions,” but Hills never quite 
says that such hints appear in Windsor.201  What he does say, 
however, is that Kennedy’s opinion in that case “fits within this 
longstanding idea that subnational law can influence the scope of 
federal rights.”202  Hills implies this means that the Court has not 
succumbed to the temptation of viewing the case through the lens 
of what Hills calls “rights fundamentalism”—“the notion that, 
because a right is very important, the right must be defined 
uniformly across jurisdictions.”203  Ultimately, however, Justice 
Scalia is correct that this is what his colleague’s opinion seems to 
do—even if it does so sub silentio, as the decision that did not 
bark. 
In his Windsor opinion Justice Kennedy emphasizes, time and 
again, what he said in Romer—that, “‘discriminations of an 
 
 197.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2717 (2013) (quoting 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 198.  Hills, supra note 32 (emphasis added). 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id.  
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
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unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to 
determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional 
provision.’”204  He repeatedly places an important limitation upon 
the power of the states to “defin[e] and regulat[e] the marital 
relation.”205  It may be “‘an area that has long been regarded as a 
virtually exclusive province of the States.’”206  But, that province 
has constitutional boundaries because all state laws must “respect 
the constitutional rights of persons.” 207   Perhaps Kennedy 
frequently reminds us of this simple truth because that is what it 
is, a simple truth.  As Article VI of the U.S. Constitution informs 
us, that document is the “supreme Law of the Land,” and it 
guarantees that there are certain rights that “no state shall . . . 
abridge” (to employ the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).208  The devil is, of course, in the details, because 
what emerges from this simple truth is an important and far more 
complex question: what are the “rights of the persons” that all 
governments are constitutionally bound to respect? 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor provides one obvious 
answer to that question, but it also refuses to acknowledge that it 
has done so.  Although it is not easy to clearly identify the 
jurisprudential path that Kennedy took in Windsor, his reasoning 
includes the following syllogism: 
– In the United States, marriage is an aspect of life 
traditionally regulated by the governments of the fifty 
states.  Many states have decided to “dignify” the 
“moral and sexual choices” of their gay and lesbian 
citizens by permitting same-sex couples to get married 
(and DOMA interferes with that sphere of state 
policymaking). 
– The U.S. Constitution “protects” those “moral and 
sexual choices.” 
– DOMA interferes with those choices, and is therefore 
unconstitutional. 
 
 204.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)). 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  U.S. CONST. art. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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– Therefore . . . any state law that interferes with those 
choices (i.e. that bans same-sex marriages) is______ .209 
Fill in the blank (according to the syllogism): unconstitutional. 
Oh, but wait. The opinion and holding in Windsor are 
explicitly “confined,” in their application, “to . . . lawful 
marriages.” 210   The opinion begs the question: what are the 
“rights of the persons” that the states are constitutionally bound 
to respect?  It also begets the conclusion that there are 
constitutionally protected “rights of the persons” that any state 
law banning gay marriage violates.  This is the “rights 
fundamentalism” which Professor Hills implies is absent from 
Windsor.211  In this respect, Windsor is, as Sherlock Holmes might 
have said, the gay marriage decision that did not bark.212 
What Sherlock Holmes did say (at least, as he was portrayed 
on British television by Jeremy Brett) was that “the law is what 
we live with.  Justice is . . . harder to achieve.”213  It may seem 
glib to say that the “rights of the persons” that the states are 
constitutionally bound to respect are whatever rights a majority of 
the U.S. Supreme Court says that they are.  Yet, that is the reality 
– a reality that is also currently reflected in the narrower answer 
to the rights question.  They are basically whatever Justice 
Kennedy says they are. As Tom Goldstein remarked, “‘[t]he basic 
principle is, it’s Justice Kennedy’s world and you just live in it.’”214  
Admittedly, Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor neither exhibits nor 
exudes the type of passionate commitment to libertarian (and/or 
egalitarian) principles that one finds in his writings for the Court 
in Romer and Lawrence.  It nevertheless indicates that in all 
likelihood it will not be long before the nation’s laws on same-sex 
marriage align with the promise of justice—the promise of “equal 
justice under law” that adorns the main portico of the home of the 
 
 209.  See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 210.  Id. at 2696. 
 211.  See Hills, supra note 32. 
 212.  See Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 1 THE NEW ANNOTATED 
SHERLOCK HOLMES 387 (Leslie S. Klinger ed., 2005). 
 213.  The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes: The Red Circle (Granada 
Television 1994). 
 214.  Bill Mears, Is Anthony Kennedy ‘the first gay justice’?, CNN (June 28, 
2013, 6:49 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/27/politics/scotus-kennedy 
(quoting Tom Goldstein, Co-founder & Publisher, SCOTUSblog).   
KNOWLESFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  3:24 PM 
58 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 20:24 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
What remains to be seen is whether that alignment comes 
from We the People or from, as Justice Scalia fears, “We the 
Court.”215  Justice Scalia, along with Justices Thomas and Alito, 
viewed Windsor’s federalism references skeptically—just as they 
saw little more than fluffy rhetoric in the equal liberty 
discussions. 216   For example, Justice Alito asserted that the 
“whiffs of federalism” contained in the Court’s opinion would “soon 
be scattered to the wind.”217  For Justice Scalia, federalism was 
one of the opinion’s “rootless and shifting . . . justifications,”218 
representing nothing more than a disingenuous effort by the 
majority to obscure its real agenda and to lay the groundwork for 
“the second, state-law shoe to be dropped.”219  Although Scalia 
was “only guessing”220 about his colleagues’ motives, his acerbic 
dissent demonstrated no doubts in his opinion.221  The majority’s 
ultimate goal is to invalidate state laws banning gay marriage, 
and that goal will be achieved very soon.222  “Maybe not today, 
maybe not tomorrow, but soon,” and it will come in the form of a 
Supreme Court-issued judicial fiat, the consequences of which you, 
the nation’s disempowered citizenry, will have to live with “for the 
rest of your life.”223 
It seems clear, from Romer, Lawrence, and now Windsor, that 
if such a decision comes from the Court it will include language 
and reasoning that will prompt “Harlan’s ghost [to] smile.”224  Not 
because of the inclusion of federalism language but, rather, 
because of the inclusion of reasoning reflective of Harlan’s 
libertarian views about due process.  As I noted in The Tie Goes to 
 
 215.  This phrase is taken from the title of an article by Larry Kramer, an 
article that rails against judicial supremacy.  See Larry D. Kramer, The 
Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(2001). 
 216.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697, 2705–07 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2711, 2720 (Alito, J., 
joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 217.  Id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 218.  Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id.  
 221.  See id. at 2697–11. 
 222.  See id. at 2705, 2710. 
 223.  CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers 1942). 
 224.  Hills, supra note 32. 
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Freedom, those are views that Justice Kennedy has 
enthusiastically embraced.225  Most notably, Kennedy looked to 
them for jurisprudential guidance in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992.226  Here it is worth 
quoting from the same passage of Harlan’s famous dissent in Poe 
v. Ullman,227 which Kennedy admiringly quoted in Casey.  In Poe, 
Harlan wrote: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its 
content cannot be determined by reference to any code.  
The best that can be said is that through the course of 
this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance 
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the 
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty 
and the demands of organized society. . . . The full scope 
of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the 
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the 
Constitution. . . . It is a rational continuum which, 
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial 
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . and 
which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive 
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly 
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment.228 
 Although Kennedy did not cite Poe in Windsor, the spirit of 
this passage runs through the 2013 opinion. 229   To conclude 
otherwise is to ignore the unequivocal nature of the following, 
which appeared on the penultimate page of that opinion: 
What has been explained to this point should more than 
suffice to establish that the principal purpose and the 
necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons 
who are in a lawful same-sex marriage.  This requires the 
Court to hold, as it now does, that DOMA is 
 
 225.  KNOWLES, supra note 3, at 182–83. 
 226.  505 U.S. 833, 848–50 (1992) (quoting Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 541, 
542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 227.  Poe, 367 U.S. at 523-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 228.  Id. at 542–43. 
 229.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–96 (2013). 
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unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the 
person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution. 
The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against 
denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.  
While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from 
Government the power to degrade or demean in the way 
this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment 
right all the more specific and all the better understood 
and preserved.230 
This might not be the “the money quote from the majority.”231  
However, ultimately it might just be the one that pays the biggest, 
long-term dividends, because it makes it difficult to see how gay 
marriage bans can continue to coexist with the Constitution.  It 
also makes it difficult to agree with Professor Hills’s assessment 
that Windsor embraces a theory of federalism that permits 
“individual states . . .  [to] go different ways in deciding whether a 
particular classification is arbitrary in ways foreclosed to the 
feds.”232 
IV. THE HUMAN DIGNITY ROAD NOT TAKEN IN WINDSOR 
Some of the commentators who have recognized that 
federalism is not the key component of Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
in Windsor have sought to prove the existence of a different 
animating principle: dignity. 233   This is a principle that, like 
federalism, is something about which Kennedy feels passionately.  
In the wake of Windsor, many people rushed to declare that the 
opinion’s “foundation . . . and its real importance, lie in its 
insistence on human dignity as a constitutional value”;234 that it 
 
 230.  Id. at 2695 (citations omitted).  
 231.  Dorf, supra note 120. 
 232.  Hills, supra note 32. 
 233.  See, e.g., Nice, supra note 170; Cass R. Sunstein, Gay Marriage 
Ruling Safeguards Human Dignity, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 28, 2013, 4:15 
PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-06-26/gay-marriage-
ruling-safeguards-human-dignity. 
 234.  Sunstein, supra note 233. 
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“enhanc[es] human dignity”; 235  or that “it radically alters the 
landscape of rights in a number of ways,”236 primarily because 
“[u]nlike any other case that the Supreme Court has ever decided, 
the Court here relies emphatically on the principle of human 
dignity.”237   Some commentators seized upon the opinion’s ten 
references to “dignity”; 238  some waxed lyrical about Catholic 
concepts of dignity (opposition of the Catholic Church to 
homosexuality notwithstanding); 239  while others pointed to 
similarities between “dignity” in the opinion’s text and “dignity” in 
Jewish thought.240 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor is no more about 
individual, human dignity than it is about federalism.  Upon close 
examination it becomes clear that Kennedy generally is not 
referring to any kind of pre-political dignity in Windsor.  He is not 
referring to an inherent human dignity that exists quite apart 
from any form of civil society into which humans may or may not 
choose to enter.241  Instead Kennedy primarily emphasizes a form 
of dignity that only belongs to individuals when the State chooses 
to confer it upon them. 242   Commentators are correct that 
Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor “was based on the idea that it 
interfered with ‘the equal dignity of same-sex marriages.’” 243  
 
 235.  Nice, supra note 170. 
 236.  Erin Daly, Dignity’s Debut: A Happy Marriage of Liberty and 
Equality, RATIO JURIS (July 5, 2013, 9:16 AM), http://ratiojuris.blogspot. 
com/2013/07/dignitys-debut-happy-marriage-of.html.  
 237.  Id. 
 238.  See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 28; Sunstein, supra note 233. 
 239.  See, e.g., Liz Halloran, Explaining Justice Kennedy: The Dignity 
Factor, TWO-WAY (June 28, 2013, 2:42 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2013/06/27/196280855/explaining-justice-kennedy-the-dignity-factor; 
Andrew Sullivan, Catholic Dignity Is Evident In DOMA Opinion By Justice 
Kennedy, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/28/andrew-sullivan-catholic-dignity-
doma_n_3516539.html. 
 240.  See, e.g., Steven I. Weiss, Jewish Thought in the DOMA Ruling: 
Looking at Jewish texts and the text of the ruling, TABLET (June 28, 2013, 2:58 
PM), http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/ 136563/jewish-thought-in-the-doma-
ruling.  
 241.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681, 2692–93, 2696 
(2013). 
 242.  See id. 
 243.  David G. Savage, The Supreme Court’s new view of equal justice, L.A. 
TIMES, (June 29, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/29/nation/la-na-
court-term-20130630 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693). 
KNOWLESFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  3:24 PM 
62 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 20:24 
However, that is only part of the quotation.  For, what Kennedy 
actually wrote was: “the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a 
dignity conferred by the States.”244 
Dignity is a “vague but powerful idea”245  with widespread 
appeal.  It is difficult to define; it is susceptible to multiple 
interpretations; it enjoys “non-partisan” 246  support precisely 
because people do not have to agree about its actual content and 
boundaries; and it is useful to all. It is useful to the individual 
when, in a specific instance, he or she believes they have been 
harmed by the government but cannot identify a legal right that 
was violated.  And it is useful for the government when it turns to 
the “dignity defense” in the absence of a more convincing and 
authoritative justification that has a statutory or constitutional 
basis.  This existence of multiple “use-categories”247 of the concept 
of dignity is reflected in Supreme Court opinions, which have 
featured hundreds of references to miscellaneous types of 
dignity.248  Over the years, however, two types of dignity stand 
out for having played large roles in opinions—human dignity and 
the dignity of states.249 
 
 244.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (emphasis added).  
 245.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 (1977). 
 246.  Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 746 (2006). 
 247.  Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A 
Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry Into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L. J. 145, 
150 (1984).  
 248.  See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 
69, 77 (1941); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455 (1793). 
 249.  These observations come from a database I constructed that consists 
of the post-seriatim era U.S. Supreme Court decisions in which at least one 
opinion contained a standalone reference to the concept of dignity.  By 
standalone, I mean that when a judge writes an opinion in which he or she 
uses the concept of “dignity” to make a distinct point about his or her own 
arguments, this is considered a standalone use.  These differ from ‘dependent’ 
ones – which might include, for example, quotations from other opinions or 
from secondary sources, the descriptions of the holdings of other cases that 
explicitly rely on “dignity” or a related word, or simply references (usually 
negative ones in a separate opinion) to a judicial colleague’s invocation of the 
concept, see Helen J. Knowles, From a Value to a Right: The Supreme Court’s 
Oh-So-Conscious Move From ‘Privacy’ to ‘Liberty,’ 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 595, 
598–99 (2007).  I did not confine my search to the word “dignity,” instead 
choosing to include the following related words: “indignity,” “dignified,” 
“undignified,” “dignities,” “indignities,” “indignation,” “indignant,” and 
“dignifies.”  This is because in order to give substance and meaning to a 
concept, one needs to look at the usage of related words that suggest or imply 
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Arguably the most prevalent understanding of the concept of 
human dignity to appear in Supreme Court opinions is that which 
supports the idea that every person has, by virtue of being a 
human, a basic, inalienable dignity: “an intrinsic worth that 
should be recognized and respected” by all governments, no 
matter what.250  This pre-political dignity is part of the core of 
enumerated rights (rather than itself a constitutionally protected 
right)251 and is theoretically and morally linked to due process.  
This is because, as William Parent points out, dignity and due 
process “are conceptually related through the mediating idea of 
arbitrariness.”252  If we focus on this concept of human dignity, it 
is easy to understand why scholars who contended that Kennedy’s 
opinion in Windsor is grounded in principles of federalism shied 
away from the “dignity” references as evidence to substantiate 
their arguments. 253   Over the course of the Supreme Court’s 
history, however, the other most common type of dignity to appear 
in the justices’ opinions—state dignity—offers a very different 
understanding of the concept, an understanding which might 
indeed support the Windsor federalism argument. 
Writing in 1793, in Chisholm v. Georgia, the first case to 
feature an opinion containing a standalone use of the word 
“dignity,” Justice James Wilson observed: “A State, useful and 
valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man, 
and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance.”254  
Justice Wilson chose his words well.  The individual is more 
important than the State; a State is born from the decisions of 
individuals to form a political society.  Even after the creation of a 
State, the individual remains the primary political unit and 
 
a violation or betrayal of the original concept. 
 250.  Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in United States Constitutional 
Law, in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS 249, 249–50 (Dieter Simon & 
Manfred Weiss eds., 2000). 
 251.  See Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 
115, at 10, 10–28.  It is important not to confuse a universal understanding of 
human dignity with the idea of global/international human rights.  See 
generally Rhoda E. Howard & Jack Donnelly, Human Dignity, Human 
Rights, and Political Regimes, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801 (1986). 
 252.  Parent, supra note 115, at 66. 
 253.  See, e.g., Young & Blondel, supra note 32, at 117–18. 
 254.  2 U.S. 419, 455 (1793). 
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ultimate possessor of dignity.  This makes even more sense in a 
constitutional system, for as Walter Murphy has persuasively 
argued, constitutionalism “enshrines respect for human worth and 
dignity as its central principle.  To protect that value, citizens 
must have a right to political participation, and their government 
must be hedged in by substantive limits on what it can do, even 
when perfectly mirroring the popular will.”255  Over the course of 
its history, however, some members of the U.S. Supreme Court 
have described the state as a sovereign entity with a type of 
“dignity” entitled to legal protection—and sometimes the state has 
been afforded this legal protection in a manner that threatens the 
dignity of its citizens. This does not describe all state dignity 
references, but it is an understanding that is as prevalent for this 
type of dignity as is the pre-political understanding of human 
dignity. 
References to state dignity comprise only approximately 
eleven percent of all decisions containing at least one opinion 
including a standalone use of the concept of dignity.256   And, 
interestingly, there has been a clear downward trend in references 
to state dignity since a highpoint was reached during the period 
from the 1890s through the late 1930s.257  Nevertheless, in recent 
years the opinions penned in several high profile cases have 
suggested that the future might bear witness to a resurgence of 
interest in the state dignity concept.258  Describing a state as an 
entity whose sovereignty entitles it to legal protection of its 
dignity is reminiscent of the idea of sovereign dignity attaching to 
a monarch.  If human dignity is a founding principle of 
constitutionalism, then a tension arises between the dignity of a 
state and the human dignity of its populace.  Many of the more 
modern Supreme Court references to state dignity avoid this 
tension by departing from the monarchical analogy – they describe 
a dignified state as an entity that rules for the people, not over 
them. 259   This in part reflects the aforementioned twentieth 
 
 255.  Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, 
in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
WORLD 3, 3 (Douglas Greenberg, et al. eds., 1993). 
 256.  See generally Knowles, Constitutional “Dignity,” supra note 149. 
 257.  See generally id.  
 258.  See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 
1645 (2011) (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).  
 259.  See generally Knowles, Constitutional “Dignity,” supra note 149. 
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century evolution in understandings of human dignity—a human 
rights-based evolution that “changed the meaning of sovereignty” 
by establishing different responsibilities and liabilities for 
states.260  Nevertheless, there remain examples of opinions that 
pay little attention to the fact that “the state exists for the sake of 
individual human beings, and not vice versa.”261 
A. Dignity in Windsor 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor frequently employs a 
concept of dignity that eschews the notion of pre-political human 
dignity.262  There is little about the references to dignity that is 
consistent with Justice Wilson’s observation that, “[a] State, 
useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior 
contrivance of man, and from his native dignity derives all its 
acquired importance.”263  As Table 1 shows, the dignity references 
in Windsor instead principally speak to the concept of state-
conferred dignity. 
 
 
 260.  Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: 
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1921, 1924, 1926 (2003). 
 261.  Neuman, supra note 250, at 249–50. 
 262.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681, 2689, 2692–94, 
2696 (2013). 
 263.  Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455 (1793). 
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Table 1: Passages from Justice Kennedy’s Windsor 
opinion that reference state-conferred “dignity” 
1 “It seems fair to conclude that, until recent 
years, many citizens had not even 
considered the possibility that two persons 
of the same sex might aspire to occupy the 
same status and dignity as that of a man 
and woman in lawful marriage.”264 
2 “Here the State’s decision to give this class 
of persons the right to marry conferred 
upon them a dignity and status of immense 
import.”265  
3 “The Federal Government uses this state-
defined class for the opposite purpose—to 
impose restrictions and disabilities.  That 
result requires this Court now to address 
whether the resulting injury and indignity 
is a deprivation of an essential part of the 
liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.”266 
4 “For same-sex couples who wished to be 
married, the State acted to give their lawful 
conduct a lawful status.  This status is a 
far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the 
intimate relationship between two people, a 
relationship deemed by the State worthy of 
dignity in the community equal with all 
other marriages.”267  
 
 264.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (emphasis added). 
 265.  Id. at 2692 (emphasis added). 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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5, 6 “The history of DOMA’s enactment and its 
own text demonstrate that interference 
with the equal dignity of same-sex 
marriages, a dignity conferred by the States 
in the exercise of their sovereign power, 
was more than an incidental effect of the 
federal statute.”268 
7 “Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance 
the dignity and integrity of the person.  And 
DOMA contrives to deprive some couples 
married under the laws of their State, but 
not other couples, of both rights and 
responsibilities.”269 
8 “DOMA singles out a class of persons 
deemed by a State entitled to recognition 
and protection to enhance their own liberty.  
It imposes a disability on the class by 
refusing to acknowledge a status the State 
finds to be dignified and proper.”270  
9 “The federal statute is invalid, for no 
legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose 
and effect to disparage and to injure those 
whom the State, by its marriage laws, 
sought to protect in personhood and 
dignity.”271 
 
Passages 8 and 9 identify the entity to which “dignity” 
adheres in this case (or, phrased another way, the ‘dignified 
entity’), and it is not the individual.  Instead, it is the institution 
of marriage entered into by a homosexual couple.  This is an 
institution that is the creation of state law.  The “dignified and 
proper” “status” which DOMA “refus[es] to acknowledge” is the 
status of being lawfully married to an individual of the same 
 
 268.  Id. at 2693 (emphasis added). 
 269.  Id. at 2694 (emphasis added). 
 270.  Id. at 2695–96 (emphasis added). 
 271.  Id. at 2696 (emphasis added). 
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sex.272   DOMA “disparage[s] and . . . injure[s] those whom the 
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and 
dignity.”273  The real victims of DOMA are the gay and lesbian 
individuals who are lawfully married under the laws of their state, 
and Justice Kennedy recognized this reality.274  However, he did 
not view it as an injurious reality that was an affront to individual 
liberty.  It is not the dignity of gay and lesbian individuals that 
the federal statute negatively affects, but rather the dignity that 
their state afforded them by writing into its laws the right to 
marry the consensual adult partner of their choice, whether of the 
opposite or same sex. 
This reading of the majority of the opinion’s dignity references 
finds further support in the other passages listed in Table 1.  
Passage 1 confirms that the dignity in question is a creation of the 
state because it is the dignity attached to a “lawful marriage.”275  
As Passage 3 demonstrates, when we turn from dignity to 
“indignity” nothing changes – once again the subject at hand is a 
government-created entity.276   The only difference is that this 
time the entity is a law, and the issuing body is the federal 
government.  Similarly, in Passages 2, 4, 5, and 6 the “dignity” to 
which the Court refers is something that comes from the “State’s 
decision” to permit homosexual couples to marry.277 
Passage 7 is susceptible to two different interpretations.  On 
the one hand, when the Court speaks of “enhanc[ing] the dignity 
and integrity of the person”278 it indicates that individuals have a 
dignity that is not the creation of the state.  Rather, it is an 
inherent human trait, the existence of which is neither derived 
from nor dependent upon any governmental entity.  On the other 
hand, however, the passage also indicates that human dignity can 
be shaped (in this case, positively) by state action, thereby 
suggesting that there is an element of that dignity which, 
ultimately, is state-conferred. 
By this point, I imagine that more than one reader of this 
 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 274.  See id. 
 275.  See id. at 2689. 
 276.  See id. at 2692. 
 277.  See id. at 2692–93. 
 278.  Id. at 2694. 
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Article is understandably saying, ”hold on, all of these references 
to state-conferred dignity surely indicate that the opinion was 
indeed based on federalism principles.”  This is a fair comment, 
and one might consider it surprising that so few of the 
commentators who argued that Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor is 
federalism-focused chose to substantiate their arguments using 
the Justice’s invocation of state-conferred dignity.279  However, 
when one turns to the Windsor references to pre-political, human 
dignity, one finds that they are few in number but heavy in 
significance and substance.280  As Table 2 indicates, the opinion 
only contains two references to human dignity, 281  but those 
references speak to the equal liberty heart of the opinion.  When 
one recognizes this it becomes easier to understand why the 
advocates of a “based on federalism”282 argument did not point to 
the discussions of dignity. 
The Windsor opinion’s two references to human dignity both 
clearly indicate the existence of an individualized, pre-political 
human dignity.283   The “class” mentioned in Passage A below 
consists of same-sex couples living in a State that has conferred 
upon them a legal right to marry.284  The “community” language 
can consequently be interpreted as referring to either the LGBT 
community or the broader “community” within which these 
couples live and interact. 
 
 
 279.  See, e.g., Young & Blondel, supra note 32, at 117–18. 
 280.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694, 2696. 
 281.  Id. at 2692. 
 282.  Weiner, supra note 19. 
 283.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
 284.  See id. at 2680. 
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Table 2: Passages from Justice Kennedy’s Windsor 
opinion that reference pre-political human “dignity” 
A “When the State used its historic and 
essential authority to define the marital 
relation . . . its role and its power in making 
the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, 
and protection of the class in their own 
community.”285  
B “Private, consensual sexual intimacy between 
two adult persons of the same sex may not be 
punished by the State, and it can form ‘but 
one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring.’  By its recognition of the validity of 
same-sex marriages performed in other 
jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-
sex unions and same-sex marriages, New 
York sought to give further protection and 
dignity to that bond.”286 
 
Regardless of the precise nature of that community, however, 
Justice Kennedy’s language is unequivocal.  The community’s 
members have a “dignity,” the “recognition” of which was 
“enhanced” by the State’s decision to “[use] . . . its historic and 
essential authority to define the marital relation” as one 
recognized by law.287  As with Passage 7 in Table 1, Passage B in 
Table 2 is open to multiple interpretations.  An element of state-
conferred dignity is present because of Kennedy’s statement that 
the “personal bond” between the two individuals in a same-sex 
partnership was “give[n] further protection and dignity” by New 
York’s decision to permit those individuals to get married or to 
recognize, as legally valid, a same-sex marriage into which they 
might have entered in a different jurisdiction.288  However, the 
operative word here is “further”; the state is giving “further 
 
 285.  Id. at 2692 (emphasis added). 
 286.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 
(2003)). 
 287.  Id. (emphasis added).  
 288.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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protection and dignity” to a “personal bond” which cannot be 
anything other than pre-political. 
Therefore, what United States v. Windsor truly stands for is 
the foreclosure, to any governmental entity, federal or state, of the 
power to diminish the pre-political dignity of individuals by 
treating them differently because of their sexual orientation.  The 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution, 289  which are “conceptually related” to 
dignity “through the mediating idea of arbitrariness,”290 demand 
no less.  And for a Kennedy-led majority, that is a conclusion at 
which the Court can arrive using (a) nothing more than rational 
basis review and (b) reasoning that stands “quite apart from 
principles of federalism.”291  What, then, does the future portend? 
V. CONCLUSION: LIFE AFTER WINDSOR 
“I suppose the sea change has a lot to do with the political 
force and effectiveness of people representing, supporting your 
side of the case?”292  During the oral argument in Windsor, Chief 
Justice Roberts put this question to Roberta Kaplan (who was 
arguing on behalf of Edie Windsor).293  Roberts never received 
what he considered to be a satisfactory answer to his question.  
His tone suggested he was genuinely struggling to understand 
what accounted for the clear, positive change in the nation’s 
attitudes towards the rights of the LGBT community since the 
passage of DOMA in 1996.  “I am just trying to see how—where 
that that [sic] moral understanding came from, if not the political 
effectiveness of a particular group,” explained Roberts. 294  
Responding to questions about the intent of Congress when it 
passed DOMA in 1996, Kaplan had earlier contended that “the 
only conclusion that can be drawn is what was in the House 
Report, which is moral disapproval of gay people, which the 
Congress thought was permissible in 1996 because it relied on the 
Court’s Bowers decision.”295  After observing that in Lawrence, the 
 
 289.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 290.  Parent, supra note 115, at 66. 
 291.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
 292.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 107. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. at 109. 
 295.  Id. at 105. 
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Court emphatically said “Bowers was not correct when it was 
decided, and it is not correct today”;296 Kaplan made a “times can 
blind” and 2013-is-most-definitely-not-1996 argument.297  It was 
this that prompted Roberts’ causal inquiry about the intervening 
years of gay rights advancements.  Even if there was 
disagreement inside the courtroom about why 2013 was not 1996, 
no one disputed that over the past seventeen years “enormous 
changes in the surrounding social and political contexts” had 
taken place and that “extraordinary developments [were] afoot 
with regard to attitudes and practices involving sexual 
orientation.”298 
When the Court decided Lawrence on June 26, 2003, no state 
had legalized gay marriage.  Five months later, on November 18, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced its decision 
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, holding that the 
state’s ban on gay marriage violated the Massachusetts 
Constitution.299  That ruling took effect on May 17, 2004, the date 
upon which the first same-sex marriages were conducted in the 
Bay State area.300  By the tenth anniversary of Lawrence, the 
poignant date upon which the Court chose to issue its decision in 
Windsor, gay and lesbian couples were able to legally marry in 
nine states and the District of Columbia. 301   And, within six 
months of Windsor, that number had jumped, quite remarkably, 
to fifteen states.302  Indeed, it seems certain that by the time this 
Article is published the number in the previous sentence will have 
 
 296.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 132, at 105–06. 
 297.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 105–06. 
 298.  Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and 
Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 130, 135 (2013). 
 299.  798 N.E.2d 941, 948–49 (Mass. 2003). 
 300.  See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ 
05/17/us/massachusetts-arrives-at-moment-for-same-sex-
marriage.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1; Same-sex couples exchange vows in 
Massachusetts, CNN (May 17, 2004, 11:02 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/mass.samesex.marriage/.  
 301.  Massachusetts (‘04), Connecticut (‘08), Iowa (‘09), Vermont (‘09), New 
Hampshire (‘10), District of Columbia (‘10), New York (‘11), Maine (‘12), 
Washington (‘12), and Maryland (‘13).  
 302.  The states that legalized gay marriage within their borders between 
Windsor and December 2013 are California, Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, and Rhode Island. 
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changed numerous times (upwards).  “At least in this context, 
federalism is a one-way ratchet toward liberty . . .  A civil rights 
advocate is tempted to think, Vive la Fédéralisme!”303 
“[C]autions are,” however, most definitely “in order,” 304 
because just as easily as the American federal system can with 
one hand give liberty to the LGBT community, it can take it away 
with the other.  So many signs point to an immediate future in 
which we will see a continuing increase in the numbers of states 
legalizing gay marriage, and the percentage of Americans 
supporting not just that institution, but the extension of further 
civil rights protections to gays and lesbians.305  Although, it is 
undeniable that federalism has played positive and negative roles 
in the evolution of gay rights in the United States.306  As I have 
demonstrated in this Article, what the forces of federalism did not 
control was the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in United 
States v. Windsor, nor did they constitute the dominant theme in 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in that case.  To conclude 
otherwise is to ignore the extent to which his opinions in Romer, 
Lawrence, and Windsor should be viewed together as a set of 
judicial writings—through which runs an abiding commitment to 
advancing the cause of equal liberty for individuals regardless of 
their sexual orientation. 
*** 
As a May 21, 1964 talking points memorandum from Bill 
Moyers to George Reedy indicates, the themes of Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society speech were consciously long-term in 
nature.307  Of the eight points in the memo, four were expicitly 
focused upon the consequences for America beyond the election 
 
 303.  Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, An Ephemeral Moment: 
Minimalism, Equality, and Federalism in the Struggle for Same-Sex 
Marriage Rights, 37 N.Y.U REV. LAW & SOC. CHANGE 199, 210 (2013). 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  See Klarman, supra note 298, at 155–57. 
 306.  These roles have been extensively documented elsewhere.  A good 
overview is provided in Tribe & Matz, supra note 303.  For an excellent 
comparative analysis of the ways in which the forces of federalism shaped the 
civil rights of gays and lesbians in the United States and Canada, see 
generally MIRIAM SMITH, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND LESBIAN AND GAY 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2008). 
 307.  See WARNER, supra note 8, at 5. 
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year of 1964.308  The intention was to construct a Great Society for 
“the next generation”309—or, perhaps in the preambular words of 
the Constitution, for “ourselves and our Posterity.”310  As we have 
seen, in 1964 the inclusive nature of those long term Great Society 
principles was decidedly limited; they were not viewed as 
extending to members of the LGBT community.  This has since 
changed—change has come incrementally, but it has come.  
Therefore, while there is still much progress to be made, fifty 
years later we can look at the legacy of the Great Society and say 
that it was built upon key principles that are entirely consistent 
with the themes of equal justice under the law that represents the 
body and soul of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor.  In other 
words, upon close examination we can see that it is necessary to 
take Justice Kennedy’s own words seriously, because that opinion 
was indeed crafted “quite apart from principles of federalism.”311 
 
 
 
 308.  See id. at 5, 8. 
 309.  Id. at 5 (quoting Memorandum from Bill Moyers to George Reedy 
(May 21, 1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 310.  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 311.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2705 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (quoting id. at 2692) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
